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 The economic performance of the New Zealand economy is influenced by the legal
environment for contracting.  In general, production and investment will be optimised by
a legal environment that minimises the transactions costs associated with writing and
enforcing contracts.
 
 Until the regulatory reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s, heavy-handed regulation and
government ownership were pervasive in New Zealand.  Under this regime, the bulk of
large-scale infrastructure investment was undertaken by the public sector; long-term
contracts between private sector entities were uncommon, and the scope for
opportunistic action was limited by regulatory proscription of activity. The efficiency
implications of the legal framework for contracting in New Zealand have been enhanced
by the deregulation and privatisation of economic activity in the period since 1984
(Evans, Grimes and Wilkinson, 1996) has enhanced the importance of contracting for
the performance of the economy as a whole.  Considerable infrastructure management
and investment is now in private hands, and the terms of private contractual agreements
together with competition law provide the principal restrictions on the actions of market
participants.
 
 Under New Zealand law, no provision of a contract may be enforced where it is in
breach of the Commerce Act (s. 27(4)).  Further, as Dammery (1999) has indicated, the
courts in New Zealand have taken the view that pending a decision on the substantive
question of legality under the Commerce Act, a contract provision that is plausibly
claimed to be in breach of the Act cannot be enforced.  From the perspective of
economics, the efficiency of this decision depends very much on the incentives of the
party that has sought refuge in an appeal to competition law.
 
 In this paper we provide an economic perspective on the application of competition law
to contracts.  In Section 2 we set out an economic framework for the analysis of
contracts.  In section 3 we provide an outline of a contract and relational framework
between two firms.  This contract contains certain of the key features of the Clear vs
Telecom case analysed by Dammery. We do not examine all of the relevant facts of that
case: rather we use key features as a relevant example.  We set out and analyse the
2allocation of risk-bearing implied by the structure and pricing regime in the contract. We
point out the implications of not treating a contract as a coherent bundle of rights and
obligations, and thereby treating provisions as distinct elements. In Section 4 we
consider the interface between contract and competition law for the contract set out in
Section 3.  We analyse the decision problem facing an entrant who has the option of
appealing to competition law and is disadvantaged by the outcome of a contract with a
dominant incumbent.  We argue that the entrant will have inefficiently strong incentives
to appeal to competition law.  In addition, we show that the option for the entrant to
appeal to competition law will have a pervasive influence on the terms and conditions of
the contract, and will produce a marked reduction in the efficiency of the contracting





The terms and conditions agreed by parties to a contract establish their legally
enforceable rights and responsibilities.   From the perspective of economics, contracts
provide a transactions cost-minimising means of establishing constraints within which
rational individuals maximise the pursuit of their goals consistent with the interests of
other parties to the contract.
The literature in economics (see Katz, 1998 and Shavell, 1998) views contracts as a
means of limiting opportunism by constraining behaviour. As Posner (1992: 91) has
observed,
“…the fundamental function of contract law … is to deter people from behaving
opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage the
optimal timing of economic activity and …obviate costly self-protective
measures.”
Because the potential for opportunism is pervasive, all contracts establish explicit or
implicit constraints on the actions of parties.1
                                                          
1 Section 27(2) of the Commerce Act provides that contracts that have or may have the effect of
substantially lessening competition  are ….. In the context of the view that all contracts provide constraints
3Contracts typically contain a balance of incentive payments and provisions for
monitoring that minimise transactions costs. Normally, the more reliance placed on
incentives, the lower are monitoring costs. Contracts allocate property rights in
specifying what components of any contract are held or owned by any party at any time.
Because it is not possible to control the realisation of states of the world, contracts
allocate risk both explicitly and implicitly. Risks are allocated between parties in a
manner that, ceteris paribus, has parties that are more willing and able to carry risk
assuming more risk relative to other parties.  The terms of the contract will embody
compensation for the risk explicitly and implicitly assumed by each party.
From the perspective of economics, all provisions of legal contracts should be enforced
irrespective of the ex post facto distribution of gains associated with completion of the
contract, and this maxim is applicable in all market situations. This is because contracts
explicitly or implicitly allocate risk among the parties, and provide expected returns to
each party that are consistent with information available to the parties at the time that
the contract is signed.  Greater ex ante investment in information relevant to the
contract by either party will improve the efficiency of the contracting process.  No
increase in efficiency can be obtained by reinterpreting contracts in the light of
information obtained during the term of the contract or after its completion, though such
information may improve the efficiency of subsequent contracts.
The requirement that all provisions of legal contracts be enforced whatever the ex post
facto distribution of gains from them has the greatest impact on dynamic efficiency; that
is, the efficiency of ongoing economic interaction in society.  Contracts stipulate actions
and outcomes on which investment in information, assets and actions specific to the
contract may be undertaken.  Because these investments are based on the terms of the
contract, a lower level of investment will result if there is uncertainty about the
enforceability of the contract.
If an asset can be converted to alternative uses at negligible cost, then it will be able to
earn a return on its replacement value, irrespective of the withdrawal of one use. Assets
                                                                                                                                                                            
on behaviour, one might argue that many contracts are, or could be held to be, in breach of the Commerce
Act.
4specific to the contract are vulnerable to hold-up2, particularly where this takes the form
of negotiation of a lower price for the use of the asset after it is in place than would have
been agreed before the investment was made.  Specific assets increase the
transactions costs of contracting3 by requiring either credible contracts or
vertical/horizontal integration as a means of avoiding hold-up.  Although contracts
reduce transactions costs in many contexts, it is for specific assets that the
enforceability of all contractual provisions is most important.  It follows that it is in
respect of investment in specific assets that a failure for the courts to enforce the ex
ante bargain enshrined in the contract will result in the greatest reduction in dynamic
efficiency.
Where a buyer of a service has only one seller with whom they may deal, the seller may
be in a position to impose a wide range of terms on the seller – in effect to offer a “take
it or leave it” offer.  It does not follow, however, that the buyer would be indifferent to the
terms of the contract offered, or that the contract represented “the only option” for the
buyer.  As Posner (1992: 115) points out:
…since a monopolized product will be priced higher than it would be
under competition, prospective buyers will invest more, rather than less,
in search; and one form of consumer search is careful reading of the
contract.  It is also false to conclude that it will not pay the consumer to
read the contract if he knows the monopoly seller will not bargain
(haggle) with him, for he must still decide whether to buy the product or
do without.
In other words, the existence of a monopoly seller may result in more rather than less
contract-specific investment in information by the purchaser, and that information will
include an assessment of alternative applications of the funds being used in the
transaction with the monopolist.
                                                          
2 One of the recurring economic themes of repeated transactions is the benefit to be obtained by the
opportunity to make a commitment (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, s.3.2.3)).  The seemingly paradoxical
result that commitment that necessarily constrains opportunism has value arises because it affects other
parties’  opportunities.  The credibility of any commitment is termed “time consistency” in economics, where
it means that incentives are such that terms of a contract will not be violated. Time consistency has had
much currency in economic public policy literature, where a time consistent policy is one that the
government has incentives to stick to the policy (for macroeconomics see Mankiw, 1988).
3 See Williamson (1979).
5In situations such as that considered by Posner, competition statutes have a prime
effect on the operation of contracts.  If there is a dominant firm in the market,
competition statutes may require the firm to act as if the market were more competitive,
and the courts may view failure to strike a contract as evidence of anti-competitive
behaviour.  Thus, competition law may constrain the contracts that firms, particularly
dominant firms, may offer and accede to.
The application of competition law to contracts is justified by the social costs that result
from contracts whose terms are shaped by or facilitate the exercise of market power.  It
is economically efficient for competition law to make such contracts unenforceable, and
more generally, to provide a framework within which the costs and benefits to society
may be assessed.4  To use competition law to rule a contract unenforceable requires
that there is some departure from efficiency that is correctable under competition law.
The complexity associated with assessing society’s interest in the efficiency of contracts
is most apparent in respect of the concept of dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency is
provided when the legal and institutional framework in society provides the lowest costs
and distortions to economic interaction in order that economic efficiency is optimised
over time.  It follows that inefficiency at one point in time need not be dynamically
inefficient or imply that there is an alternative contract that will provide a better outcome
for society as a whole. For example, rents earned by a dominant incumbent firm may not
be dynamically inefficient: if those rents attract entry that increases output and
stimulates technological innovation, then contracts in the market may be consistent with
dynamic efficiency and maximising the present value of social welfare.  Similarly,
patents (which can be viewed as legal sanction to write exclusion contracts), provide a
monopoly at one point in time, but competition in the process of developing patentable
innovations. The institution of patents is designed to enhance dynamic efficiency, at the
potential cost of static efficiency.  Thus, actions aimed at static efficiency problems are
consistent with improvements in social welfare only where they improve or do not reduce
dynamic efficiency.  Static efficiency problems must be perceived as very likely to persist
into the future if there is to be any case for the application of competition statutes.
                                                          
4 Shavell (1998, 441-442) discusses the implications for efficiency of various measures of damages.
63. The Contractual Framework
 Description of the Contract
The contract that we consider in this paper is signed at time period T, and has the
following features:
1. The contract is between two firms: Aco, a dominant firm in a network industry, and
Bco, a new entrant to that industry.  These two firms compete in offering a
homogeneous product to households. Their networks have a large element of
specificity.
2. Aco and Bco have a long running dispute about the terms on which Bco can utilise
part of Aco’s network for the delivery of services.
3. Aco and Bco agree on a contract that:
• Settles all disputes arising from the past relationship between the two firms.
• Establishes terms, including a pricing regime, under which Bco may use the Aco
network for the delivery of services (“the terms of interconnection”).  In particular,
the pricing regime provides for payment of no access fee and a constant per
minute charge for time on the network with no volume or duration discounts.
• Applies for a fixed term of five years.
In time period T+1, Aco expands its use of a new off-peak charging regime for its
households.  This pricing regime was used on a trial basis in time period T-1, and this
was public information at time T.  The pricing regime in the contract between Aco and
Bco makes it difficult for Bco to match the prices Aco is offering to households.  At T+2,
Bco ceases to pay Aco for the interconnection services that it is consuming, and the
courts find that payments may be withheld pending a decision on the substantive issue
of whether provisions of the contract breach the Commerce Act.
 Analysis of Risk-Bearing in the Contract
The interconnection contract represents but one element of the class of two-part tariff
interconnection contracts.  This class includes the following three special cases:
71. A volume usage charge with the fixed connection fee set at zero. This is the
interconnection pricing regime of the contract between Aco and Bco.
2. A volume usage charge and a fixed connection fee.
3. No volume usage charge and a fixed connection fee.
The choice between the three pricing structures, and the choice of the level of access
and usage fee, will influence the expected return and other aspects of the agreement
that each party requires to sign the contract.  This is because the three pricing
structures provide for different allocations of risk-bearing between the two parties to the
contract.
To examine in more detail the implications of the choice of pricing structure for the
allocation of risk, we will consider two types of uncertainty about the future5: uncertainty
about states of the world and uncertainty about the strategies of parties to the contract;
including final pricing and bypass.6
1. A contract with no fixed connection fee and a volume usage charge means that Bco
does not carry any of the risk associated with the ability to obtain market share and
the scale of its operation.  Whatever the scale of Bco’s business, it pays a flat per
minute usage charge, and neither higher–than-expected or lower-than-expected
volumes of business change the per minute rate.  Conversely, this means that in
terms of this contract Bco does not have access to any volume discounting that
other forms of two-part tariffs would provide.
This contract with no fixed connection fee and a volume usage charge allocates to
the purchaser (Bco) the risk that either Aco or another supplier might adopt a pricing
strategy that made the volume usage charge disadvantageous.  While this risk is to
some extent endogenous to the contractual relationship (Aco is a party to the
contract), any disadvantage to Bco could be exogenous in that a third party might
adopt such a pricing strategy. That is, outside the Aco-Bco contract, the contracts
market, that we shall term the spot market, poses risk to Bco of pricing strategies
that are costly to Bco because of the usage charge structure.
                                                          
5 The inability to contract over all contingencies and quantities that are verifiable invariably means that
contracts are incomplete.
8The usage-charge-only tariff places the risk of the investment in specific assets
(network assets) that bypass Aco’s specific assets squarely with Aco. Bco reduces
its full unit payment to Aco for each unit switched to any network established by Bco.
In addition, the usage charge means that demand risk stemming from business
cycle fluctuations is absorbed largely by Aco.
2. A network interconnection contract that has both an access fee and a user charge
shares risk in that it allocates some of the state-of-the-world risk to the purchaser, as
opposed to the party that supplies the network services who is paid through a lower
usage charge.
3. A contract with a fixed connection fee and no volume usage charge provides strong
incentives for the purchaser to increase business volume, and allocates to the
supplier the risk that they will be able to do so.  In this case Aco bears the risk that
the volume of Bco’s business will be larger than the expected volume on which the
fixed connection fee was set.  Under this contract Bco carries the risk that the state
of the world will involve a downturn in demand for interconnection services.  Bco also
carries the risk that Aco will adopt a competitive strategy that limits Bco’s market
share. The risk of alternative final-pricing strategies is shared as compared to case
1.  The risk of bypass to Aco is reduced and the incentive for Bco to bypass is also
reduced.
Two other aspects of risk deserve attention. First, our contract requires the delivery of
interconnection services for a fixed period and at a fixed price.  This provision of the
contract allocates to the purchaser the risk of a fall in the spot market price of
interconnection services, while the supplier bears the risk of a rise in the spot market
price.7  Second, our contract establishes a price for a five-year period.  This is a long
term given the rate and uncertainty of technological change and new entry to the
modern telecommunications market.  Under the contract between Aco and Bco, the
                                                                                                                                                                            
6 We make no claim to evaluate here all the relevant aspects of any actual interconnection contract. The
properties of interconnection contracts and their relationship to economic efficiency is a vast topic. We do
not consider, for example, any implications, under the contract, of Aco using Bco’s network.
7 By a rise in the spot price we mean a rise relative to expectations. The terms of the interconnection
contract will have been influenced by each parties’ expectation of future spot prices. In telecommunications
these might well have been expected to decline over the period of the contract.
9latter firm bears all of the risk that over the five years of the contract technical change or
new competition will drive down the spot price of interconnection faster than expected.
Where the industry is characterised by rapid technical change this provision would be
disadvantageous to Bco, and the more so because if the spot price falls surprisingly
quickly it may not be in Aco’s interest to renegotiate. This provision and the relatively
long term of the contract would strengthen Bco’s incentive to bypass Aco’s network in
this event.
To summarise, Bco accepted a contract that assigned to Aco much of the risk
associated with the level of business generated by Bco and the bypass of Aco by Bco.
It assigned to Bco all of the risk that the spot market price of interconnection access
might fall more quickly than expected, and also the risk that new pricing regimes such
as off-peak discounting might become important in the market.  In terms of its contract
with Aco, Bco bears this risk whether it is Aco or a third party provider that adopts the
new pricing regime.  Over the long period of the contract, both assignments of risk seem
counter intuitive, since Bco should be best placed to assume some risk associated with
its volume growth, and since Aco should be best able to bear at least some of the risk of
the emergence of new pricing strategies (especially those that it develops itself).
Nonetheless, the economist presumes that these allocations of risk were recognised at
the time that the contract was written.
 Interpreting the Contract As A Whole
We have seen that the final allocation of risk between Aco and Bco under the contract is
complex. Moreover, the allocation of risk in the contract as a whole is influenced by a
number of different features and provisions of the contract.  Consequently, contracts
must be considered and interpreted as a whole.
Contracts are the outcome of a negotiated acceptance of a bundle of obligations. To set
aside any aspect of the bundle without the agreement of both parties would affect the
willingness of parties to accept the residual components of the contract and the benefit
of the contract to them. We illustrate this with two aspects of the contract. The
importance of this conclusion lies in the effect on future contracts. If it becomes
accepted that provisions of a contract can be set aside, contracts will be designed to
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allow for this contingency. If relevant parts can be identified ex ante, contracts may be
written that approximate the collection of a set of almost self-contained subcontracts.
This would reduce efficiency by reducing possible contractual trade-offs and thereby the
set of available contracts. The reduced set of acceptable contracts may in fact reduce
the incentive to enter contracts and thereby influence investment.
The first example of the importance of treating the contract as a whole applies to the
settlement of past disputes included in the contract.  Aco and Bco have simultaneously
agreed on a settlement of outstanding issues relating to their past business interactions and
terms governing aspects of their future relationship. The settlement must therefore be
viewed as an integral part of the contract.  This is true because if the terms of the
settlement were more generous to either Aco or Bco, then that party would be prepared to
accept less favourable terms in respect of the contract for their future relationship.
Decisions at time T will be affected by expectations of the future. For example, the
settlement may differ according to whether or not there is to be a contract. Given that there
is a contract, the settlement will have been affected by the terms of the forward-looking
contract, even if the contract does not incorporate transfers between parties explicitly
relating to the relationship before T (i.e. it does not explicitly incorporate aspects of the
settlement). The effect of expectations about the future on the settlement may simply occur
via their effect on the bargaining position of each party. This will generally differ according
to whether the agreement at T is “one-shot” (i.e. marks a termination) or part of a “repeated
game” (e.g. one agreement in a series of agreements/activities associated with a
relationship running into the indefinite future).8 To set aside or interpret only the settlement
or the agreement relating to ongoing business is to attempt to interpret only part of the
contract.
The second example of the importance of treating the contract in its totality concerns the
allocation of risk bearing that is fixed in the contract. Recall that under the contract, Aco
bears much of the risk associated with the level of business and bypass. Bco carried the
                                                          
8 There is a growing literature in which game theory is used to analyse the implications for contracts of
opportunism (Schmidt (1998, 432)) in repeated relationships (Salanié (1997, ch.7)).
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risk that the spot market price of interconnection might fall more quickly than expected,
and of the evolution of new pricing regimes by any market participant. This outcome
resulted from the parties’ assessments of the future and their willingness to carry risk as
embodied in the contracting process. To set aside the payment of the usage charge,
even for a period of time, is to quite alter the allocation of risk between the two parties.
The expectation of this possibility of ex post re-allocation of risk by treating contracts
provison by provision must raise the transactions costs of any contract.
In sum, setting aside some provisions of a contract may alter the balance of rights,
obligations, risk and expected return that was negotiated in the contract as a whole.  In
this case it would be inefficient to enforce the residual of any contract having set aside
any part of it.
4.  The Interplay of Contract and Competition Law
Breach of Contract
No matter how much the parties to a contract invest in ex ante consideration of
implications of contractual terms in future (uncertain) states of the world, there exists the
possibility that one party will wish to be relieved of certain of the obligations set out in
the contract.9  In these circumstances a party will have at least four options.
(1) Absorb the losses resulting from the fulfillment of the contract.
(2) Negotiate with the other party to obtain satisfactory terms on which they may be
relieved of the obligations set out in the contract.
(3) Unilaterally breach provisions of the contract, accepting any penalties for breach of
contract that might be set out in liquidated damages clauses in the contract or that
might be applied by the court.
(4) Unilateral breach and seek legal means of having relevant provisions invalidated,
such as claims that they breach competition law.
                                                          
9 Re-negotiation is typically required to yield ex post efficient outcomes in any state of the world. But it
reduces the protection of specific investments, and thereby dynamic efficiency.
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Options (1) and (2) are probably most common in practice.  If the term of the contract is
relatively short, the costs of re-negotiation during the term of the contract may be
greater than the losses associated with fulfillment of the contract.  If the contract is
longer term, then the costs of contract fulfillment may be large enough to make re-
negotiation appropriate.  The party that has benefited from the state of the world may re-
negotiate for several reasons.  First, default on the contract may be costly for both
parties (as where both parties have made contract-specific investments), and the party
that has benefited from the changed circumstances may benefit more from the re-
negotiation than from compensation payable on default. This will especially be the case
where compensation is not forward-looking.  Second, the contract may represent part of
a longer term or wider business relationship.  In both cases the party that has benefited
from the outcome of the states of the world may have incentives to make concessions in
re-negotiation rather than enforce the contract.
If, however, re-negotiation is not mutually advantageous, the disadvantaged party will be
prepared to bear the costs of breaching provisions of the contract whenever this is
cheaper than completing the contract.  Further, the disadvantaged firm will be willing to
invest in legal means of having the provisions invalidated, including appeals to
competition law, up to the point of expected costs of liquidated damages and/or court-
imposed costs for breach of contract.  In this case, one of options (3) and (4) will be
adopted. Because firms will assess and choose between these two options based on
the expected payoff each provides, the two options are (from the perspective of
economics) closely linked.
 Breach of Contract or Appeal to Competition Law
The factors affecting the choice between options (3) and (4) are summarised in the
following representation.10  The disaffected party to the contract will choose the lowest
cost option of either
                Unilateral Breach(B)   or        Breach and invoke Competition Law(C)
                                                          
10 We recognise that anticipated future costs and benefits (as well as the likelihood) of an ongoing
relationship between the parties will also affect the decision.  We abstract from this problematic issue by
presuming that the possibility of, and the nature of, any future relationship will be unaffected by the choice
between the different approaches to breaching the contract. We have also assumed that a direct breach of
the contract draws compensation payments.
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The costs associated with these two options are:
The cost of a unilateral breach is the expected (E) compensation plus the legal costs
( ) of obtaining it. The expected gain from appealing to competition law depends
upon the probability of winning under competition law (pr).  It consists of the legal costs
of the competition law action ( ) plus payment of compensation should it fail less
any possible award should it win, both adjusted for the probability of winning.   Note that
it is the costs of the disaffected party that enter the calculation; no other agent’s costs
are included. Note also, that if future relationships are not affected, any award or
compensation will simply be transfer payments: they only influence resource use, and
hence economic efficiency to the extent that they affect decisions taken in the future.
The resource costs are the legal costs. The total of these will include that of the party
being breached against as well as that of the court system; and all these would have to
be assessed to evaluate the economic efficiency of the choice of the disaffected party.
The party will choose competition law if
which illustrates that there can exist a very strong incentive to apply competition law
even if the case is weak: that is, even if the probability of success is low.  For any level
of legal costs, the higher is the expected compensation and anticipated award the lower
will be the probability of success that will make it worthwhile for a party to a contract to
challenge it under competition law.  This finding is enhanced by the fact that the
determination of undesirable situations/behaviours under competition law is very inexact.
The complexity of assessments of efficiency increase the potential for “type 2” errors to
be made11; that is, to find a breach of competition law when in fact there is no departure
from the public interest.
                                                          
11 For any given “type 1” error probability.
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This way of thinking about the payoff to alternative feasible actions where breach of
contract is desired by one party also indicates that parties to a contract may have
stronger incentives to challenge the provisions of the contract than do outside parties.
Private third parties may challenge a contract where they are disadvantaged by a
breach of competition law.  If the court finds that a breach of competition law has
occurred, the third party may be awarded damages and will in addition benefit from the
absence of the anti-competitive behaviour in that market in the future.  Parties to a
contract who challenge it under competition law may also obtain the benefits of
damages and altered market circumstances in the future.  In addition, however, if the
party to the contract has been disadvantaged by exogenous events during the term of
the contract, this party will also benefit from the removal of the costs associated with
continuing to meet the terms of the contract.
 Impact of Competition Law on Contract Design
There is no unambiguous definition of contractual provisions that are in breach of the
Commerce Act.  In most cases, it is a time consuming and expensive process to
ascertain whether the Commerce Act has in fact been violated.  The ambiguity and
expense of ascertaining compliance with competition law is increased by the particular
words used in the New Zealand Commerce Act.
Section 27 (1) of the Commerce Act states that
“No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an
understanding, containing a provision that has the purpose, or has or is likely to
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market”.
The underlined phrase also appears in sections 27 (2) and 27 (4) of the Act.  This
phrase lowers the standard, and alters the nature, of proof.  It appears to provide for the
possibility that a provision of a contract that is likely to have the effect of substantially
lessening competition at some time during the term of the contract represents a breach
of the Act. Goddard (1997, 457) suggests that contracts that facilitate long term vertical
or horizontal relationships should be treated as merger decisions: thus, if a contract is
acceptable under competition statutes at the time it is written then these statutes should
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have no future application to the contract.  This argument also follows from the view that
no aspect of the realisation of exogenous events during the contract should be viewed
as relevant to the interpretation of the competitive implications of the contract.  Thus, to
suggest that the Commerce Act could be breached by provisions of the contract that
may substantially lessen competition given some realisation of events that were
uncertain at the time that the contract was signed is not consistent with economic
efficiency.  It would be extremely costly for parties to consider whether the different
provisions in the contract might be regarded as a breach of the Commerce Act under
future strategies and future states of the world.  This would, in turn, significantly
increase the costs of signing long-term contracts, and might result in parties being
unwilling to sign efficient long-term contractual agreements.
One effect of the words used in Section 27 (1), (2) and (4) of the Commerce Act is to
provide parties to a contract with an option exercisable during the term of the contract.
This option to claim that provisions of a contract breach the Commerce Act could be
exercised in the event that either party viewed the realisation of outcomes from the
contract to be disadvantageous.  It is at least plausible that at the time that Aco and Bco
signed their contract they both recognised that contract provisions may be breached
through an appeal to competition law.  What would be the implications for efficiency if
we assumed that Aco’s and Bco’s advisers had studied the Commerce Act and
recognised this potential at the time that the contract was signed?
Opportunities to claim violations of the Commerce Act are not symmetrical between the
two parties to the contract that we have described.  It is less credible for a dominant firm
to claim that a contract reflects the exercise of market power by a small entrant than
vice versa.  We would expect this asymmetry to be reflected in the provisions of the
contract.
The ability of Bco to use the Commerce Act to breach the contract will, ceterus paribus,
reduce the extent to which Bco invests in information relating to the contract.  This will
reduce the efficiency of the contract, since efficiency is enhanced by increases in the
information available to either party to the contract.  It will also mean that Bco will be
willing to sign a contract for a longer period, even though its reduced investment in
information would normally suggest a shorter contractual period.  The option to use
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competition law as a means of breach provides Bco with protection from outcomes that
might make a long-term contract disadvantageous to it. This will have implications for
the design of the contract.  In particular, we would expect the terms of the contract to
provide Aco with some compensation for the ability of Bco to limit its downside risk in
this way.
If only Bco may credibly use a claimed violation of the Commerce Act as a means of
breaching a contract provision whose ex post realisation is disadvantageous for it, Aco
will respond in several ways.  First, it is likely that Aco will make a larger specific
investment in information relating to the outcome of the contract.  In the absence of an
option to breach provisions of the contract, it will be in Aco’s interests to investigate the
range and probability associated with outcomes that it would regard as
disadvantageous.
Second, Aco’s optimal response to Bco’s option for breach will include shortening the
length of contract. A shorter contract restricts the period over which there will be
uncertainty about the realisation of contingent events. As compared to longer contracts,
changes in market circumstances can be managed at contract renewal rather than
within the parameters of an established contract.  A short term will limit both the value
and the credibility of attempts to use competition law to resile from the contract.  It will
reduce the magnitude of any damages or penalties payable if any provision is deemed
to violate the Commerce Act, and reduce the magnitude of any losses suffered from
honouring it.  Thus, a short term will reduce the incentive for Bco to use competition law
to breach the contract. In general, this is likely to have the effect of inhibiting dynamic
efficiency by reducing the period of commitment required for investment in specific
assets.
Third, Aco’s preference for a short-term contract, its specific investment in information
relating to provisions of the contract, and its lack of an option to breach a provision all
suggest that Aco will require a higher expected return to sign a given contract.  That is,
the terms of the contract will have to be more favourable to Aco to compensate for the
option that the Commerce Act provides for Bco to challenge contract provisions once
the outcomes are realised.
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More generous terms for Aco create a further problem: they increase the likelihood that
in evaluating the contract the Commerce Commission or the High Court will take the
view that the contract breaches the Commerce Act.  These bodies should consider the
fact that the option for Bco to claim a breach of the Commerce Act after the contract has
been signed makes it more likely that the terms of the contract will look advantageous to
Aco.  This balance of advantage in the contract will, however, reflect efficient
contracting, not the exercise of market power.
Where the courts are willing to rule a provision unenforceable until there is a substantive
decision on the case, the incentives for Bco are amplified.  A claim of breach of the
Commerce Act may result in the plaintiff being able to reduce or suspend payments,
making the defendant an involuntary creditor of the plaintiff, and with court delays this
situation may persist for a substantial period of time.  If the claims of Bco are motivated
in part by adverse changes in market circumstances that influence its financial viability,
then the Commerce Act option will be particularly attractive.
Our analysis suggests that the option for Bco to utilise the Commerce Act to breach
provisions of the contract will result in the two parties having different views about the
optimal length of the contract.  In particular, Bco will prefer a long-term contract, but
without the option to appeal to the Commerce Act a shorter contract allowing for regular
renegotiation of terms might be preferred.  The option available to Bco will also influence
the distribution of expected returns associated with the contract, and provide an
asymmetry in the incentives for Aco and Bco to invest in information relevant to the
negotiation of the contract.   More generally the potential to appeal to the Commerce Act
increases the costs associated with writing long-term contracts, and hence reduces
dynamic efficiency in the economy as a whole.
5 Means of Addressing the Incentive Problems
We have argued that for Aco and Bco there are asymmetries in both the incentives to
appeal to competition law and the credibility of any such appeal. In this section we
consider some means by which these asymmetries may be addressed.
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1. First, we note that it is not possible for the two parties to agree that the
Commerce Act will not apply to their contract: Private contracts cannot override
the Commerce Act.  An alternative to contracting out would be for the Commerce
Commission to be able to review and authorise contracts as a whole ex ante. 12
 
2. The Commerce Commission could indicate that it would take action against both
parties to a contract if either party succeeded in a private Commerce Act action
against the contract.
 
3. The Commerce Act could be amended so as to be less expansive in its definition
of contractual terms that could be held to be a breach of the Act.
 
4. Recognising the incentives for parties disadvantaged by the outcomes of
contracts to make spurious claims of breach of the Commerce Act, the High
Court could adopt a strong test for the consideration of such appeals.
 
5. When there is evidence that the ex post realisation of gains in the contract has
given the complainant a private interest in resiling from contract provisions, this
strong test might include enforcement of the provisions of the contract until there
is a decision on the substantive issue.
 
6. Where any provision is found illegal, the whole contract becomes unenforceable.
This will ensure that contracting tradeoffs that determine the balance of parties’
interests across provisions are considered more thoroughly in any consideration
of a challenge of any specific provision. Section 89(2) of the Commerce Act
presents this opportunity to the Court now.
We view all of these courses of action as worthy of consideration in the sense that they
have the potential to enhance efficiency by improving incentives, reducing the scope for
opportunism, and lowering the costs of writing contracts.
                                                          
 12 Presently this can only be done for prospective contractual arrangements tested against one or more
specific subsections of the Commerce Act.
19
6. Conclusion
The purpose of competition law is to promote economic efficiency of which a large
component is dynamic efficiency. Impediments to efficiency should be addressed by the
application of competition law only insofar as these impediments are expected to persist
into the future.  Because enforceable contracts are critical to dynamic efficiency, it is
properly a function of the administration of competition law to bolster the enforceability
of contracts.
Parties to contracts in New Zealand have a “Commerce Act option” to claim that
provisions of the contract breach competition law.  Because it will not normally be
credible for a dominant incumbent to claim that an entrant used its market power to
insert inefficient provisions into a contract, the Commerce Act option introduces an
asymmetry into the contracting process.  This asymmetry will increase the transactions
costs of contracting.  It will also influence the term of the contract that is preferred by the
different parties, the distribution of expected returns between the two parties, and the
willingness of the two parties to make investments in information relevant to the
negotiation of the contract.  As a consequence, we have argued that the Commerce Act
option will reduce the dynamic efficiency in the economy as a whole.
In interpreting any claimed violation, courts should consider that an entrant who is
disadvantaged by changes in states of the world will have a strong incentive to claim
that provisions in thecontract violates the Commerce Act.  This will be true even where
there is a low probability of a judgement in their favour (that is, where the case is weak).
An action brought on this basis has no grounding in economic efficiency.  In addition,
where both parties anticipate that the entrant has the option of breaching provisions by
appealing to the  Commerce Act:
• Entrants will rationally make lower sunk investment in information relating to the
contract and, despite this low investment, prefer a long-term contract.
• The incentives for the dominant firm are to write a short-term contract and to make a
substantial sunk investment in information relevant to the writing of the contract.
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• To compensate for the Commerce Act option, the entrant will have been willing to
offer and the dominant incumbent will require, a higher expected return over the
term of the contract.
The incentives and actions of the plaintiff in the contracting process must be considered
in forming a view about the credibility of any claimed breach of the Commerce Act.  In
cases conforming to the scenario for Aco and Bco analysed in this paper, the incentives
for the entrant, Bco, to make spurious claims of breach of the Commerce Act are high.
Consequently, we consider that pending a substantive decision on the case, the contract
provisions should be enforced.  These factors suggest to us that a determination that
the Commerce Act had been breached should only be made where the breach is plain.
Marginal breaches would be too difficult to distinguish from an efficient contract given
the incentives created and balance of returns necessary to compensate for the
Commerce Act option.  We have also suggested that the Commerce Commission
should consider taking action against both parties to a contract if either party succeeded
in a private Commerce Act action against the contract.  Implementation of these
suggestions would, in our view, mitigate the efficiency losses that currently result from
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